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MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE ROOSEVELT COURT
ALFRED 0. CANON*
His mind was keen and analytical; his background in the law was
impressive; his opinions were logical and persuasive. In short, he was
a legal technician of the highest caliber. But he was more than that-
much more. For he combined with great capacity of mind a nobility of
character and grace of spirit which made of his life a never-ending
search for the right, the just, and the decent.1
The career of Mr. Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge on the Supreme
Court of the United States came to an end on September 10, 1949.
His passing signified the end of a man's work-and the end of an
era. As Rutledge's last opinion became a part of American constitu-
tional history, the Roosevelt Court disappeared and a new alignment
of majority and minority was born.
The influence of Rutledge in this important period of constitutional
development will be difficult to measure until the broader outlines of
contemporary social, political, economic, and legal trends are more
firmly sketched in the future. A justice's total impact on the law is
actually, as Attorney General McGrath stated in 1950, an "in-
tangible heritage" which "constitutes his truly enduring monument"
and is incapable of assessment.2 The following summary of Rutledge's
contributions to the law and of his relationship to his colleagues on
the Court is perhaps justified by the belief that political philosophy
is in a constant state of flux. New ideas and institutions are con-
stantly challenging the old for supremacy. Concepts that have stood
for decades are evolving into new patterns of thought. In times
such as these, it is imperative, as Rutledge himself once remarked,
that as one stands at the end of the marked way, he must go forward
with caution, keeping sight, so far as possible, upon the great land-
marks left behind and the direction they point ahead.3 Perhaps
an appraisal of a justice's relationship to the Court may reveal some
of the landmarks of his era and the direction which they indicate for
* Dean of Alumni, Southwesteri at Memphis.
1. Vinson, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 35 IowA L. REv. 542 (1950).
2. In Memory of Honorable Wiley Rutledge-Proceedings before United
States Supreme Court, 36 IowA L. REv. 591, 602 (1951) (Address by Attorney
General J. Howard McGrath).
3. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 43 (1946) (dissenting).
167
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the future. Rutledge was probably not a "great judge," in the histor-
ical sense, but his ideas and opinions may be valuable for the solu-
tions which they provide for basic questions of the present and future.
Wiley Rutledge was the product of the "small town" environment
of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Tennessee. As the son of a Baptist
minister, he came from a middle income society and received his
basic undergraduate training in a small Presbyterian college of East
Tennessee, before finishing his initial college work in Wisconsin. In
the eight years that he struggled to obtain a legal education (1914-
1922), he experienced the ordeal of an attack of tuberculosis and man-
aged to work his way to a law degree while teaching and working
in public school systems in Indiana, New Mexico and Colorado.
In a relatively short period of time, from 1922 to 1939, he established
himself as a competent teacher of law, having served on three law
school faculties in the Middle West and as dean in two of these schools.
Although he did not enjoy a reputation as an outstanding legal scholar
or administrator, he made a significant record as a teacher and as
one interested in social justice, clearly indicating his sympathy for
the socio-economic aims of the New Deal program.
Here was a man, then, who came to the federal bench in 1939
possessing the experience of a boyhood in a preacher's family, an
education in the colleges of the South and Middle West, a victory
over physical and economic disadvantages in securing a legal educa-
tion, a successful career as law school professor and administrator,
and a sympathy for the social and economic objectives of the New
Deal. Most important of all, he had a strong faith in a vital growing
system of law and justice that would provide the basis for a demo-
cratic society which guaranteed the integrity and independence of
the individual and assured the protection of such values as freedom
of conscience, freedom of speech and press and the fair opportunity
to earn a living.
4
As a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
Rutledge exhibited many of the qualities and factors which were
later to stand out as distinctive features of his opinions on the
United States Supreme Court. He generally favored a broad con-
struction of statutory law and procedural rules.5 This was borne
out particularly in the cases dealing with the rights of labor,
4. No complete biography of the Justice's life has been written. The best
accounts may be found in Brant, Mr. Justice Rutledge-The Man, 35 IOWA
L. REV. 544 (1950); Brudney and Wolfson, Mr. Justice Rutledge-Law Clerk's
Reflections, 35 IowA L. REV. 578 (1950); Wirtz, Mr. Justice Rutledge-Teacher
of Men, 35 IOwA L. REV. 566 (1950); In Memory of Honorable Wiley Rutledge
-Proceedings before United States Supreme Court, 36 IOWA L. REV. 591 (1951)
(also published in separate brochure by the United States Supreme Court).




divorce actions, and the interpretation of wills, although with respect
to patent claims, he favored a strict interpretation of the patent
laws (i.e., a tendency to support the claims of an earlier patentee
when opposed by a late challenge to the patent).
The justice displayed a most favorable attitude toward labor and
consistently upheld the rights of the working man per se,6 as well
as the power of the administrative machinery of the government to
protect such rights. In most instances Rutledge was prone to favor
an administrative official or agency in cases coming before the
Court.7 He insisted that administrative remedies should be exhausted
before the courts could hear complaints against an agency and he
felt that the courts should not intervene in the discretionary powers
of administrative officials. He did, however, speak out against such
officials or agencies when he saw evidence of a seemingly arbitrary
attitude on their part, which resulted in undue hardship to the
private party concerned.
To Rutledge one of the most essential factors in the adjustment of
legal claims was the principle that "responsibility is commensurate
with power," whether the holder of power be a holding company,
the owner and driver of a vehicle requisitioned by the police, a
charitable hospital, or a trustee. In each instance Rutledge demanded
that the one exercising power in a particular relationship accept the
responsibility that such authority might entail when faced with
varying situations that called such power into play.8
In a very real sense, Rutledge spoke out for the "growth of the
law." He not only favored the development of the administrative
process, which had a definite effect on the evolution of the judicial
process, but also felt that it was the function of the Court to utilize
every means (outside and inside the decision law of the Court) to
search out the roots of currently accepted ratio decidendi so that
logical applications of a growing law might be found to fit the needs of
justice in the present era.9 If past applications were based on fallacies,
the law should be shifted to more solid principles.10
Along with this attitude (in fact, underlying it) there was a
firm belief that the substance or intent of law was more important
than a cold, methodical application of legal technicalities. In pro-
6. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
7. American Gas & Elect. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 763 (1943); Nolde & Horst Co. v. Helvering, 122 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir.
1941); International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
8. Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Balinovic
v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 113 F.2d 505, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (dissent-
ing).
9. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
10. Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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cedural or jurisdictional questions, and in taxation cases, he insisted
that the Court find and apply the substantive purpose of a statute
rather than hide behind the "technical differences in organizational
structure," for example, which would perhaps follow the "letter," if
not the "spirit," of the law. He frequently condemned the hypex-
technical interpretation of statutes which, according to him, created
hardships for the individual petitioner, and he also strongly accused
those who attempted to hide behind legal technicalities in order to
escape punishment or to evade pecuniary liability."
Through all of Rutledge's writing there ran a deep, intense concern
for the rights of the individual. He was a champion of the "under-
dog," whether the latter happened to be a member of a religious
minority group, an injured party in a tort action, or simply one of
the poor who could not buy legal protection against injustice.
12
The law, he felt, should serve as the bulwark of the individual and
his liberty in every aspect of his social and economic relations. This
was the cornerstone of the structure of opinion that he built while
on the Court of Appeals. It was only the foundation, however, for
the more monumental piece of work that was later to be developed
as an associate justice on the Supreme Court. As one considers
Rutledge's later opinions, he is drawn to the conclusion that these
were the full development of ideas and concepts that were formulated
initially on the Court of Appeals.'
3
In attempting to summarize Rutledge's "constitutional thought"
as a member of the Supreme Court, his views on five subjects will
be briefly outlined: the commerce clause, the administrative process,
federal judicial power, state power and the fourteenth amendment,
and civil liberties.
The Commerce Clause
Of the fourteen separate opinions which he wrote relating directly
to an interpretation of the commerce clause, thirteen dealt with some
aspect of state taxation or regulation as it affected interstate com-
merce.14 In ten cases, the state regulatory or taxation plan was up-
11. Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 659 (1942); Melvin v. Melvin, 129 F.2d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (con-
curring); Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(dissenting).
12. Howard v. Overholser, 130 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Wood v. United
States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1941).
13. A more complete account of Rutledge's work on the Court of Appeals
may be found in CANON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF WILEY RUTLEDGE C.
2 (unpublished doctoral thesis in Duke University Library 1953); Forrester,
Mr. Justice Rutledge-A New Factor, 17 TUL. L. REv. 511 (1943); Fuchs, The
Judicial Art of Wiley B. Rutledge, 28 WASH. U.L.Q. 115 (1943).
14. For excellent discussions on Rutledge's position with respect to the
commerce clause and State taxation, see CANON, op. cit. supra note 13, cc.
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held, while in one instance a municipal ordinance was invalidated
as a violation of the clause. In one case Rutledge agreed that the
basic right of the state to regulate or tax interstate commerce should
be sustained, although he felt that some aspects of the taxation were
invalid.
In all of these opinions there was one dominant thought. This was
the belief that "practical effects or considerations" should be the con-
trolling factors in determining the validity of state legislation, rather
than mere formulae or labels. For example, he forcefully argued
that the label of a tax, i.e., "sales" or "use," was never as important as
the ultimate effect which such a tax would have on commerce.15
He believed that invalidating a state tax simply because it fell "di-
rectly" on interstate commerce was unjustified unless it could actually
be shown that the net result of such a tax was to harm that commerce
in a concrete manner. Reasoning in this fashion, he upheld state
regulation of "foreign commerce" where such commerce was per-
meated with a special "local interest."'16 The doctrine, of course,
operated at times to the disadvantage of the state, for Rutledge re-
jected a municipal license tax on solicitors when it resulted in the
virtual prohibition of out-of-state vending and discriminated against
the itinerant merchant in favor of the local shop. The tax was not
sustained even though it was alleged to be one imposed on the
"local incident" of solicitation, for the substantial effects, actual or
potential, of the particular tax in suppressing or burdening commerce
unduly were the dominant issue-not the label attached to the tax.17
The Justice thus rejected the plea that goods in transit during inter-
state transportation could not be taxed, with the assertion that the
occasion and purpose of the interruption in transit was more im-
portant and controlling than the ultimate destination of the goods.'3
In the twenty-eight cases involving state regulation or taxation of
interstate commerce in which he participated, he voted to uphold
the state action in twenty instances. This did not mean that he
favored a restrictive interpretation of congressional power under
the commerce clause. On the contrary, he consistently expressed the
belief that the clause was a broad instrument of power through
which the Congress might solve the most pressing economic and
4, 5; Abel, The Commerce Power: An Instrument of Federalism, 25 IND. L.J.
498 (1950); Mendelson, Recent Developments in State Power to Regulate and
Tax Interstate Commerce, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 57 (1949); Rockwell, Justice
Rutledge on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 493
(1950); Note, Justice Rutledge and State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 399.
15. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 259 (1946) (concurring); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S.
440 (1946); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 349 (1944) (dissenting).
16. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
17. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
18. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947).
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social problems of this industrial era.19 Rutledge sought to justify
the use of the federal commerce power where needed and to provide
a reconciliation between this power and the states' efforts to regulate
or tax commerce, when necessary.20 If Congress had hot spoken with
respect to the subject under discussion, he followed the Cooley formula
in a doctrinal sense. This meant that the Court's function, as he
saw it, was to point out those subjects requiring uniformity of
regulation, as distinguished from those for which diversity was more
desirable.
21
Under the federal principle the states should be left to experiment
with economic and social legislation, so long as this did not conflict
with the broad national regulatory schemes. He urged that the Court
"indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the states' action"
so that they could be "free to improve their regulatory techniques as
scientific knowledge advances, for here too experimentation is the
life blood of progress." Consequently, he would have attached little
importance to the kind of local policies which the states sought to
implement by various controls. However, he would have had the
Court investigate the degree of local concentration which was in-
volved. In this fashion Rutledge would have upheld the state's right
to regulate transportation which crossed the country's boundary, to
establish standards for the elimination of fraud in business, and to
conserve its natural resources. It was not a cut-and-dried formula
that he proposed-rather a case-to-case inspection of the facts and
their adjustment by the Court to the broad national legislative picture,
as it affected, interstate commerce. In the absence of some solution
advanced by Congress, the Court might (in effect, through "in-
terstitial legislation") solve a problem such as competing state taxes
by giving exclusive power to tax to the state of market or require that
one state give credit to the taxes of the other state.
Ruledge's position relative to the various regulatory aspects of
the commerce clause, as developed through congressional legislation,
indicated strong support for federal regulation. In cases dealing with
some aspect of labor relations, he was 93 per cent "pro-labor," or more
accurately, "pro-employee," voting with the majority of the Court
in 81 per cent of these cases. He was 96 per cent "anti-monopoly,"
casting his vote in 80 per cent of the cases with the majority. His
highest rate of agreement with the Court's majority came in the ICC
cases, where he was 88 per cent in agreement, establishing a record
as approximately 68 per cent "pro-ICC." In other phases of federal
19. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
20. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 409 (1948) (concurring); Aero May-
flower Transit Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947).
21. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96 (1948) (concurring);




regulation, he agreed with the majority 80 per cent of the time and
cast 74 per cent of his votes "pro-federal regulation."
It is, therefore, submitted that the Justice's attitude toward the
regulation of labor relations, trusts, railroads and other carriers, and
other aspects involved in legislation based on the commerce clause
formed another portion of his liberal philosophy, consistent with his
beliefs with respect to civil liberties and other phases of law and gov-
ernment. He firmly believed in the power of the government to safe-
guard the rights of the individual, whether the latter be a worker, an
employer, or a small business man threatened by the action of a
monopolistic conspiracy. He advocated a liberal, comprehensive con-
struction of legislation designed to assure the protection of the in-
dividual employee. Accordingly, he voted, for broad coverage of such
statutes as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Re-
lations Act, and the Railway Labor Act, also emphasizing the sweep-
ing liability and responsibility of employers under such legislation
as the Federal Employers' Liability Act.22
He was not, however, blind to the potential threat to individual
freedom posed by labor unions themselves. Consequently, although
he strongly defended unions against arbitrary legislation which he
felt would unjustly curb their freedom, he upheld the right of the
individual workers to throw off or reject union domination and di-
rection at the moment of their own choosing.23
Giving strong support to application of antitrust legislation, Rut-
ledge indicated his belief that the government should act vigorously
to strike down monopolies and thereby preserve a healthy competitive
system. In this connection, he emphasized the duty of the Court to
determine liability under the law and thus to fashion a remedy to
fit the fault.24
Of equal importance with his substantive thought on the commerce
clause was his technique. Rutledge was not one to fall back upon
ambiguous formulae or stereotyped doctrinal "labels" for the ap-
proved solution of a difficult problem. Nor did he attempt to set up
a specific doctrine of his own as the basis for future decision. He
22. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Levinson v. Spector Motor
Service, 330 U.S. 649, 685 (1947) (dissenting); Walling v. General Industries
Co., 330 U.S. 545, 550 (1947) (dissenting); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944);
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
23. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945); May Dep't.
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 393 (1945) (concurring); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 688 (1944) (dissenting). For two
opinions in which he forcefully defended the rights of labor unions, see
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948) (concurring); United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (dissenting).
24. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948); United States v. South Buffalo Ry., 333 U.S. 771, 785 (1948) (dis-




looked instead to a positive analysis of the facts on a case-to-case
basis, the objective being to square these facts with the original
purpose of the commerce clause, as he saw it, and the pattern of
legislation developed by Congress under the clause.2
Rutledge viewed the clause in its positive aspects as a broad grant
of regulatory authority to the federal government which could utilize
it as the basis for a comprehensive system of economic regulation and
readjustment. This was particularly true of labor and antitrust
legislation. His concept of the negative aspects of the clause was
equally significant. He did not believe that interstate commerce per se
was exempt from state regulation or taxation. State action in the
field of interstate commerce was to be fitted into the broad pattern
of federal regulation. If Congress had not taken action in a particular
area, the state was free to tax or exercise its regulatory powers so
long as it did not impose, along with similar action in other states,
a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce that would place it
at a disadvantage in competition with intrastate commerce. Where
both federal and state legislation attempted to regulate a particular
phase of interstate commerce, Rutledge sought a means of fitting the
two systems into the broad pattern of regulation, consistent with the
common objective desired by national government and state.
His work with respect to the commerce clause was not strictly
original, as he merely developed and amplified concepts already ad-
vanced by others such as Stone. In the closing terms of the Roosevelt
Court (i.e., 1946-1948), he remained as the sole advocate of the
"multiple burden" criterion and the most vigorous opponent of the
trend toward "decision by labels" (i.e., "local incident," etc.) as
sponsored by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and others. There appeared
to be little evidence at his death that his ideas and concepts had had
a profound effect on the Court, and its decisions. Although he repre-
sented the majority in several important cases, such as the Nippert,
Prudential, Robertson, Mandeville, and Hearst decisions, his strongest
views and most penetrating analyses were found in such individual
concurrences as his Freeman opinion in which none of his colleagues
joined. Whether his views will ultimately prevail on the Court as
those of a majority is at present a matter of speculation.
His greatest contributions to the law of the commerce clause and
related federal legislation were his emphasis on the case-to-case
analysis of the practical effects of the statute under examination (in
the view of the statute's purpose) and his positive approach to the
more permissive features of the clause, as it related to state action.
He thus helped to build the foundation for more extensive federal
regulation in many areas (especially in furthering and protecting
25. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
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the rights of labor) while upholding the power of the states to
expand their systems of taxation and regulation in accordance with
the limitations of the federal system.36
The Administrative Process
In the eighty-one non-unanimous decisions involving the eight
major administrative agencies in the period from 1943 to 1949, Rut-
ledge favored the administrative agency in approximately 69 per cent
of the cases. He would probably be considered a member of the
Roosevelt Court's "left wing," which, as Professor C. H. Pritchett
pointed out in his work on The Roosevelt Court, consistently voted to
sustain the administrative agency but showed a distinctly unfavorable
attitude toward the Interstate Commerce Commission, in relation to
the other agencies.
Rutledge believed in the administrative process as an integral part
of democratic government and defended it when he felt that it was
being unduly restricted by the judiciary. He did not hesitate, however,
to condemn arbitrary administrative procedure when, in his opinion,
it appeared to cause inequities for the individual concern or constituted
a flagrant disregard of the statutory mandate.
In upholding the actions of administrative agencies in conducting
hearings or investigations, Rutledge sustained the right of an ad-
ministrative official to subpoena the records of a corporation.2 7 He
also asserted that an "oral argument" was not necessarily mandatory
in a hearing,28 and he maintained that no "particular form of pro-
cedure" was essential, so long as a "hearing" was held at some point
in the administrative process. 29 Moreover, he declared that what
constituted due process in a hearing was to be determined by "differ-
ences in the particular interests affected, circumstances involved,
and procedures prescribed by Congress for dealing with them."
30
A factor involved in Rutledge's attitude toward this subject was his
insistence that the courts should not quickly overturn an agency's
determination of fact or its acceptance of evidence. Thus he argued
that the courts should not force an agency to put on "blinders" by
forbidding it to consider facts in closely related cases when arriving
at a decision in each case, and he believed that an administrative
agency, not the courts, was the arbiter of the "paramount public in-
terest," to the extent that the courts could not substitute their own
26. In the opinion of one writer, ".... if his commerce clause insights were
his sole claim to remembrance, they still would entitle him to a very high
rank among American judges." Abel, supra note 14, at 498.
27. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
28. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
29. Inland Empire Dist. Council, Lumber Workers' Union v. Millis, 325 U.S.
697 (1945).
30. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
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views concerning particular situations for the agency's judgment on
matters committed to its determination.31
Another factor favorable to the administrative process was Rut-
ledge's assertion that the individual defendant had the burden of
proving that an administrative action was invalid, unfair or unreason-
able.32 Moreover, he felt that the defendant was customarily bound
to exhaust completely all administrative remedies available to him
before calling upon the courts for assistance.
33
There were, on the other hand, occasions when Rutledge insisted
that the administrative agency establish an adequate basis in the
record for orders and regulations which it issued, and he did not
hesitate to "correct" an agency's interpretation of the statutory man-
date concerned. He was careful to emphasize in these cases, however,
that although the courts were reversing an administrative order,
either on the insufficiency of evidence presented or on the basis of an
"incorrect" interpretation of the statute, they were taking this step
with full recognition of the freedom which the administrative agency
would customarily enjoy in its determination of basic issues, with-
out interference by the courts.
The most basic criticism which Rutledge was to register against the
administrative process was not levied against the administrative
official or agency per se but was an indictment of the administrative
procedure devised by Congress. In two significant opinions, he as-
serted that Congress could not require the courts to enforce adminis-
trative regulations when only the administrative agency was em-
powered to determine their constitutionality. A procedure of this
nature was, in his opinion, decidedly lacking in due process.
In the last analysis, therefore, Rutledge was acutely conscious of
the role that the administrative process was designed to play. He
subsequently endeavored to support and defend it, although he was
not blind to the dangers involved, should administrative procedure
be allowed to operate without the proper safeguards provided by the
judicial process.
Federal Judicial Power
Rutledge was well aware of the fact that the federal judicial power
was an important weight in the balancing of national and state powers
in the federal scheme. He did not, therefore, hesitate to advocate
its use in safeguarding the supremacy of the national government,
31. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947) (concurring);
United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515 (1946).
32. United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641 (1949).
33. Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
34. Barrett Line, Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 179 (1945); Eastern-Central
Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194 (1944).
35. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946) (concurring); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 460 (1944) (dissenting).
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as well as the rights of the individual citizen. In the latter respect,
for example, he firmly believed that the full faith and credit clause was
a significant factor in the establishment and maintenance of equitable
relations between citizens of different states and the states them-
selves. He therefore advocated a liberal interpretation of the clause
which would guarantee that judgments of one state would be accepted
with the greatest respect in other states. His greatest fear was that
it would be so "diluted" or stripped of its proper function by dubious
interpretations of the Court that it would fail to bring about an ac-
commodation of the conflicting interests of the states.6
The Justice strongly believed that the federal judicial power should
be used in a positive fashion. This was the foundation for his attitude
when he faced the fact that constitutional rights of citizens were
being restricted or denied through the functioning of a state's electoral
process. Although he agreed on two occasions that federal judicial
power should not intervene in the states' handling of this question,
because of certain "circumstances" affecting the situation, 7 he de-
manded on another occasion that the Court assume jurisdiction and
hold hearings on the merits of the complaint.38 He was not prone
to retreat behind the label of a "political question" when he felt that
only the active support of the federal judiciary could adequately
guarantee the rights of the citizen under the Constitution.
It was in other aspects of the federal question, however, that
Rutledge was to make his most definite stand behind federal judicial
power as the essential factor insuring federal supremacy. In several
cases dealing with the issue of governmental tax immunity, Rutledge
spoke out consistently in upholding the McCulloch v. Maryland prin-
ciple that the states were without power-unless Congress had given
consent-to tax the United States, its property, or its functions.39
He warned that this rule-the "essence of federal supremacy"-
was not to be "chipped away by ambiguous decisions of state courts."
In the same fashion he asserted that federal claims to funds of in-
dividuals took precedence over claims by a state.40 It should be
noted, of course, that he upheld the right of the state to tax private
"persons" engaged in an ordinary business that was related to govern-
mental activity,41 and he insisted that when Congress wished to tax a
state's business operations, it should do so in an explicit fashion.
42
36. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (concur-
ring); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 236 (1946) (dissenting); Williams v.
North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 244 (1945) (dissenting).
37. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (concurring); Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1946) (concurring).
38. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) (dissenting).
39. Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 489 (1946) (dissenting).
40. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948).
41. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
42. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946) (concurring).
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When federal judicial power came into conflict with state judicial
power, the Justice was quick to outline the limits of the two spheres
of authority, recognizing in the process the supremacy of the former.
Quite critical of the Erie ruling, he declared that state law should
not be allowed to preclude protection of a federal right in federal
courts, and he insisted that control of diversity jurisdiction must not
be left in the hands of the states.43 He constantly reminded the Court
that the effect of the Erie rule was to bring federal judicial power
under state authority only on matters which were essentially of local
interest and which were normally under state control. Although he
believed that citizens of the District of Columbia should share in the
privileges of the diversity clause as a "state," he spoke out against
legislation which would have brought about that effect in that it
would involve an extension of the legislative jurisdiction of Article I
to federal district courts which were organized under Article III.
44
He clearly favored a policy of judicial conservatism, i.e., that the
Court should not accept jurisdiction of issues which had not been
adjudicated in "final judgment" by a state court or issues which had
been "settled" by state courts in highly ambiguous language.45 He
agreed, however, that consideration for the rights of individuals
should at times temper this policy of judicial restraint when lengthy
litigation would be prolonged by the Court's refusal to assume juris-
diction.46
In conclusion, one may say that Rutledge was determined that the
federal judicial power should be used as an instrument of government
to insure national supremacy in the federal system. Although this
may seem to have indicated a belief in strong centralized government,
the Justice saw the value of the states in the federal scheme and in-
sisted on their playing a distinctive role, as witness his stand toward
the commerce clause. He did not hesitate, however, to sanction the in-
tervention of the federal power in the internal affairs of a state when
such action was necessary to protect the individual and his constitu-
tional rights.
State Power and the Fourteenth Amendment
As one who believed passionately in the liberty of the individual,
Rutledge frowned upon state action that threatened such liberty and
43. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949)
(dissenting); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 201 (1947) (dissenting);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (dissenting). I I
44. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604
(1949) (concurring).
45. Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543 (1947); Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 -(1947).
46. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604




looked with favor upon powers of the state exercised in a fashion
that would protect individual freedom. He insisted that the due process
clause, for example, function as a bulwark of personal liberty. For
him it meant that the state was forced to furnish adequate counsel for
defense,47 that it could not nullify basic rights through procedural
strangulation or by virtue of "experiments" in criminal procedures,
"imported from alien traditions. '48 Due process was a guarantee that
there would be calm judgment and action on the part of the state
trial judge,49 including the "proper construction" of state legislation
that affected the basic rights of citizens.50 It meant that evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was not to be admitted
in state courts5l and that the courts should always be open to protect
the citizen against conviction under ambiguous and inconsistent legis-
lation.
In a broader sense, Rutledge interpreted the due process clause as
a restriction on the states' power to forbid the advocacy of a practice
so long as such advocacy did not invite or induce action.52 It was
also a protection for union officials who wished to solicit member 5 3
and a guarantee that those critical of the judicial process could be
punished by the courts only when the functioning of the judiciary
was obstructed in some clear and substantial way.54 As a bulwark for
property owners, the due process clause demanded that there be a
sufficient factual connection-both economic and legal-between the
taxing state and the subject of the tax.
On the other hand, Rutledge was quick to assert that due process
did not restrict the regulatory power of the state to protect workmen
through compensatory legislation or to change and alter institutions
of property in the public interest, so that a just accommodation of
the rights of citizens might be secured when they clash. 55
As for the equal protection clause, Rutledge believed that it should
also play its part in protecting the individual from arbitrary state
power. He insisted, for example, that it meant an obligation on the
part of the state to provide education for Negroes that was equal, in
fact, as well as in legal fiction, to that provided for white persons,
47. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 141 (1947) (dissenting); Gayes v. New
York, 332 U.S. 145, 149 (1947) (dissenting); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561,
563 (1947) (concurring); Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 91 (1946) (dis-
senting).
48. Y) re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948) (concurring); Parker v. Illinois,
333 U.S. 571, 577 (1948) (dissenting).
49. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 168 (1949) (dissenting).
50. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (dissenting).
51. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949) (dissenting); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 420 (1945) (dissenting).
52. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 98 (1948) (dissenting).
53. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
54. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946) (concurring).
55. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 74 (1948) (dis-
senting); Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).
1957 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
thus beginning the breakdown of state discrimination against large
proportions of its citizens. 56 He expressed the idea that under the equal
protection mandate a state could not exclude some women from a
particular type of employment while permitting other women to enter
such work.5 7 A state was also precluded, in his opinion, from issuing
licenses to engage in a business or profession solely on the basis of
family relationships.58 In two instances, however, he upheld the
power of the state to exclude minors from certain types of work
(while allowing adults to engage in same)5 9 and to protect the
right of a person to obtain employment without being forced to join
a labor union,6 0 when the state's authority was challenged on equal
protection grounds.
It seems probable that Rutledge's greatest contribution to this par-
ticular aspect of constitutional law may have been the preferred
place which he gave to the "great and indispensable freedoms" of the
first amendment, in relation to the property rights of the Constitu-
tion which were protected by less exacting rules of procedure. A
statement made in relation to the price-fixing power of the federal
government during wartime gave the most concrete expression of
this concept:
Since in these cases the rights involved are rights of property, not of
personal liberty or life as in criminal proceedings, the consequences,
though serious, are not of the same moment under our system, as appears
from the fact that they are not secured by the same procedural protections
in trials. It is in this respect perhaps that our basic law, following the
common law, most clearly places the rights of life and to liberty above
those of property.6 '
This attitude was clearly revealed in Rutledge's votes on the cases
before the Court that outlined the conflict between state regulation
and the fourteenth amendment, as the following figures illustrate:
Pro-state Anti-state Agreement
Regulation (%) Regulation (%) w/majoritv (%)
Rights of Accused Persons 9 91 64
Freedoms of Speech, Press
and Religion 5 95 79
Right to an Education, Right
to Work, etc. 44 56 78
Property and Taxation 92 8 92
56. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 151 (1948) (dissenting).
57. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (dissenting).
58. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commr's, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947)
(dissenting).
59. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
60. AFL v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949) (concurring).
61. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 521, 525 (1944) (concurring).
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It is evident from this summary of his opinions and votes that Rut-
ledge conceived of due process and equal protection as two of the
most important protections of individual liberty. He did not hesitate,
therefore, to invoke their use when individual freedoms were chal-
lenged or endangered by state power. On the other hand, he did
not permit the fourteenth amendment to operate as a rigid restriction
on the states' power to protect or advance the social and economic
welfare of their citizens through taxation and regulatory legislation.
Civil Liberties and Citizenship
Whatever his contributions in other fields of law may have been,
Rutledge left a definite mark in the constitutional history of civil
liberties.62 In defense of free speech, press and assembly, as pointed
out previously, he emphasized the belief that these freedoms should
have a "preferred place" in our constitutional system, i.e., that any
legislation restrictive of these rights would be presumed unconstitu-
tional unless shown to be justified by some immediate, clear and
present danger to the public interest.63 Voting for the right claimed
by the defendant in 79 per cent of the non-unanimous decisions deal-
ing with this issue, he upheld the right of the press to criticize the
judicial process,6 sustained the freedom of a German-American Bund
member to criticize the government in time of war,65 denounced the
ambiguous regulation of sound trucks,66 upheld the right of a union
organizer to address labor groups without prior license or restriction,6 7
and defended the union's right to engage in political activity when it
was challenged by "prohibitive regulation" by the government.68
In the realm of religious liberty, Rutledge examined with in-
defatigable thoroughness the "establishment of religion" phrase,
which, he concluded, was intended to create a complete and permanent
separation of the religious and secular spheres of authority. Going
further than colleagues Black and Douglas with respect to the sepa-
ration of church and state, he insisted that the first amendment pro-
hibited state support of religion in any form, financial or otherwise.
He therefore condemned the use of public funds to provide transporta-
tion for parochial school children 69 and declared unconstitutional the
62. Several excellent law review articles on Rutledge and civil liberties
have been published: Mann, Mr. Justice Rutledge and Civil Liberties, 35
IOWA L. REV. 663 (1950); Mendelson, Mr. Justice Rutledge's Mark Upon the
Bill of Rights, 50 COLUm. L. REV. 48 (1950); Mosher, Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge's Philosophy of Civil Rights, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 661 (1949); Rock-
well, Justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 YALE L.J. 27 (1949).
63. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948) (concurring); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
64. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370 (1946) (concurring).
65. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 498 (1945) (concurring).
66. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 104 (1949) (dissenting).
67. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
68. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 129 (1948) (concurring).
69. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (dissenting).
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use of public school buildings and equipment for religious instruc-
tion. Qn the other hand, he defended the right of a religious
minority group to distribute their religious views without license or
restraint by police officials.70
In-the field of procedural rights, as guaranteed by the first eight
amendments, he supported the defendants' claim in 91 per cent of
the non-unanimous decisions of the Court in the period from 1943 to
1949. He was the only member of the Court to uphold the defendant in
all cases involving self-incrimination or the right to counsel and
voted to sustain the defendants' claim in all but one of the search and
seizure decisions.71 He insisted that the courts extend the writ of
habeas corpus to protect a Jehovah's Witness draftee72 and alien
enemies in the custody of the Attorney General.73 Condemning the
indictment of defendants on two counts for the same offense,74 he
also opposed the "mass trial" of thirty-two defendants for a single
conspiracy. 5 He was critical of inadequate procedure on the part of
a trial judge and of the ambiguous laws on which men were convicted
and sentenced to death.7 6
His defense of "second-class citizens" showed the concern which
he felt over a tendency on the part of the courts to establish danger-
ous precedents that might affect thousands of naturalized citizens. 1
In what seemed to be a contradiction, however, he insisted that the
Constitution follow the flag overseas in the Japanese war crimes
trials,7 8 while acquiescing in the Court's refusal to condemn the treat-
ment suffered by loyal Japanese-American citizens within the coun-
try's borders.7 9
As part of a strong minority that defended civil liberties on the
Court, Rutledge, along with Murphy, went even further than Black
and Douglas in protection of the fundamental bulwarks of human
freedom and dignity. He was not concerned as much with the de-
velopment of an efficient judicial system as with the concrete conse-
quences that resulted in the application of legal rules and judicial
systems to specific fact situations. Nor was he blind to the fact that
70. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
71. See CAxoN, op. cit. supra note 13, c. 3.
72. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 187 (1947) (dissenting).
- 73. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948) (dissenting).
.74. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648 (1946) (dissenting).
75. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
76. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18 (1948); United States v. Evans,
333 U.S. 483 (1948); Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 494 (1946) (dis-
senting); Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945) (dissenting),
77. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (concurring);
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 675 (1946) (dissenting); Schneider-
man v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 165 (1943) (concurring).
78. Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759, 761 (1946) (dissenting); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (dissenting).
79. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 114 (1943) (concurring).
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the hypertechnical interpretation of theoretical procedural remedies
often denied the defendant the substantive due process of law that
was the heart of an equitable defense.
One final example of his devotion to the protections of the Bill of
Rights may be given. In the case of Adamson v. California, the Court
ruled that the self-incrimination guaranty of the fifth amendment
was not made effective against state action by the fourteenth amend-
ment. In a fifty-five page dissent in which Douglas concurred, Black
condemned this holding, with the assertion that all the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights should be caught up by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Murphy and Rutledge were not content, however, with this
guarantee of protection. In an interesting dissent in which Rutledge
concurred, Murphy extended the safeguards of civil liberty in a
significant fashion:
I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be
carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding
falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure
as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due
process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights.80
(Emphasis added.)
This phrase "fundamental standards" of procedure is the keystone
to Rutledge's philosophy of civil liberties. He approached this issue
with the a priori assumption that the highest responsibility of the
Court was to protect the dignity and freedom of the individual. This
was to be accomplished by cloaking the individual with the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment. But, if these protections
did not guarantee the goal sought (i.e., individual freedom), the
Court should resort to "fundamental standards" of justice to insure
the presence of due process in a particular proceeding; whatever these
"fundamental standards" might prove to be when put to a pragmatic
test, they formed the core of Rutledge's philosophy and faith. They
were presumably sufficient, should arguments based on specific con-
stitutional provisions fail, to override state "experimentations" in
criminal procedure, the hasty actions of military commissions, or
substantive inroads on the freedoms of speech, press and religion.
Here was a Justice who was conscious of the need for increased
governmental power for the general welfare but who was well aware
of the dangers to individual freedom inherent therein. Rutledge's
approach to this problem was both a priori and pragmatic. He un-
doubtedly had strong convictions on civil liberties and wrote these
convictions into the ratio decidendi or dissent of the Court. He was
80. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947).
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equally adept, however, in fitting the law to the individual-an action
reflecting his rhetorical question of classroom days, "of what good is
law unless it serves human needs?" One writer has, therefore, classi-
fied Rutledge jurisprudentially as a "'natural law realist' who com-
bined the humanitarianism of Thomas Jefferson with the pragmatism
of John Dewey-he employed the tenets of pragmatism as a juristic
tool or technique in applying 'natural law' concepts."
'81
Although his contributions in other fields-particularly with re-
spect to the commerce clause-may be significant, it was in the field
of civil liberties that he concentrated his efforts and thereby gave the
Court-and the nation-what may come to be some of the greatest
essays in American constitutional history. Toward the end of his
career, those who worked closely with him perceived an "accentua-
tion, if not a shift," in the emphasis which he placed on his work in
the Court:
His initial zest in dealing with all segments of the Court's docket seemed
to be tempered by his growing concern with the cumulating civil liberties
problems. More and more of his energy was devoted to concentration on
the increasing number of obstacles he felt were being thrown up to block
the road to a democratic way of life for the nation. To keep unimpeded
that road became for him the great responsibility of the Court in our
time. 82
It is perhaps yet too early to evaluate the influence which Rutledge
will have on future decisions, although it seems fairly obvious that an
era of expanding protection for civil liberties came to an end in the
summer of 1949, with the deaths of Rutledge and Murphy. Only the
passage of time will enable one to judge the influence that Rutledge's
philosophy (e.g., primarily his dissents) will have on the ratio
-decidendi of the Court, but it may not be too presumptuous to agree
-with one who wrote that "However the future lines may be drawn,
his opinions will be a persistent force in the evolving experiment of
-democratic living. ' 83 The verdict for the present, however, might
-easily rest upon the statement that Justice Rutledge was "[a]n
earnest humanitarian, who was governed by the head and by the
heart," who "stood for the maximum civil liberties, for freedom of
the individual against the power of the state, and for the most liberal
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. '84
In what respects did his philosophy approximate that of his illus-
trious predecessors and colleagues on the Court? Various writers have
indicated that he was part of what might be called the Marshall-
81. Mosher, supra note 62, at 698.
82. Brudney and Wolfson, supra note 4, at 584.
83. Rockwell, supra note 62, at 59.
84. Mosher, supra note 62, at 700.
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Holmes-Brandeis-Cardozo-Stone tradition.8 It is true that he was a
"bold" or "independent" judge in many respects. He would never per-
mit the Court to abdicate its powers or to shrink from the broad
responsibility which it should exercise. Neither his technique nor his
style of writing resembled that of Marshall, however. He did not
employ the sweeping generalizations and articulate phrases of the
Chief Justice, possibly because he felt the responsibility of thoroughly
examining the large mass of precedents pertaining to a case before
publishing his findings. Because of this "aversion to deciding in a
factual vacuum" as one writer put it,86 some have compared Rutledge
with the Brandeis-Stone method of assembling facts and data as the
basis for decision. His opinions have, therefore, been criticized for
their difficult style and unusual (some think, unnecessary) length.
Rutledge's faults in this respect, if they be such, may be excused,
or at least explained, by the fact that he was regarded by his col-
leagues as a "steady, persevering, and conscientious worker in all
judicial fields, expending exacting effort on small and large cases
alike."87 This quest for certainty and completeness-the "existence of
honest doubts, hesitantly resolved"-should not leave the impression
of aimlessness, however. On fundamental issues, once his mind was
made up, Justice Rutledge showed no hesitancy at all but boldly, if
verbosely, stated his position.8
It has been suggested that Rutledge also resembled Holmes in his
"realistic" approach to general legal problems, in his deference to
state legislation in the economic field, and in his belief that the
"postulates of the law must be established from within, grounded upon
social ends and desires rather than tradition."89 At this point the
comparison must end, however, for, unlike Holmes, he did not feel
that the will of the majority (i.e., the state legislature) should be ac-
cepted when it appeared to restrict substantive personal rights with-
out a reasonable justification under the clear and present danger
rule. In contrast to the cool, aloof detachment of Holmes, who thought
of man as a "cosmic ganglion," Rutledge exhibited an intense, at
times almost passionate, interest in the welfare of the individual.
Although the general skepticism and extreme materialism of Holmes
led him to scoff at the basic moral principles of natural law philoso-
phy, Rutledge displayed an implicit natural law humanitarianism in
civil rights opinions. In fact, there are those who have commented
85. Id. at 698; Levitan, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REV. 526, 551 (1948).
86. Levitan, supra at 551.
87. Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the
United States-In Memory of Wiley Blount Rutledge 34 (April 10, 1951).
88. For an interesting comment on Rutledge's judicial approach see Frank,
The United States Supreme Court: 1948-49, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 53 (1949).
89. Mosher, supra note 62, at 699.
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on the "warmth, vibrance and passion for justice" so characteristic
of Mr. Justice Cardozo which was also so prevalent in Rutledge's
character and manner.90
Finally, one might turn to consider the position that Rutledge oc-
cupied on the Roosevelt Court in relation to his colleagues.9 1 As
shown in Table A, the average rate of agreement between Rutledge
and the other Justices on tlhe Court, in the non-unanimous opinions












It should be noted that Rutledge agreed in more than half of these
non-unanimous decisions with Murphy, Black, Douglas, Stone, and
Reed, although there was a considerable deviation between his rate
of agreement with Murphy and that with Stone and Reed. In terms
of statistics, therefore, Rutledge was more close to Murphy, Black, and
Douglas (in that order) in his basic views and votes. On the other
hand, he appeared to have disagreed more frequently with Roberts,
Vinson, and Burton, who were, incidentally, not appointees of Presi-
dent Roosevelt.
These conclusions taken by themselves are misleading, however.
If one notes the trend in the rate of agreement between Rutledge and
his colleagues from 1943 to 1949, he may discover a significant de-
velopment that took place in these years. Table B illustrates the
rate of agreement between Rutledge and each of the justices on the
Court during the seven year period. With the exception of the first,
partial, term of 1942-43, Rutledge agreed more frequently with Murphy
than any other member of the Court. In each of the seven terms in
which Rutledge served on the Court, three of the four justices with
whom he agreed most often were Murphy, Black and Douglas. In
five of the seven terms, Reed was the fourth highest man in agreement
90. Levitan, supra note 85, at 551.
91. For a complete statistical study of the Court for the period from 1943 to
1947, see PerTcHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
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with him. In 1942, it was Jackson; and in 1945, strangely enough,
Frankfurter.
The significant aspect of these statistics, however, is the decline in
the rate of agreement between Rutledge and each of the Justices in
this period, as shown below:






















These figures indicate that by the 1948 term, his last on the Court,
Rutledge found himself in agreement with only two colleagues on
more than half of the non-unanimous decisions. He disagreed with
five of the justices (i.e., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, and
Vinson) in more than two-thirds of the non-unanimous decisions
rendered during this term. As shown by Table C, he dissented dur-
ing the 1943 term in only 12% of the decisions. By the 1946 term he
was dissenting in 26% of the decisions, and during the 1948 term
he dissented in 27% of the decisions rendered.
Of the seven members of the Roosevelt Court who served con-
tinuously, with the exception of Jackson, during the period from 1943
to 1949, Rutledge wrote fewer majority opinions than any of the other
justices.9 2 Including the 1942 term, in which Rutledge served approxi-
mately four months, he wrote sixty-five majority opinions, forty-five
concurring opinions, and sixty-one dissenting opinions. The greatest
number of opinions were written in the 1945 term of Court when he
spoke for the majority in fifteen decisions, wrote eleven concurring
opinions, and dissented in fourteen opinions. In his six years on the
Court, Rutledge delivered a total of one hundred and fifty-six dissents,
as compared with Murphy's ninety-six, Black's eighty-seven, and
Douglas' eighty.
93
In many respects, therefore, Rutledge, although a supporter of the
New Deal and its legislative program, was the chief dissenter of the
92. He wrote a total of 61 majority opinions during this period (excluding
the 1942 term) as compared with Douglas-139, Black-133, Reed-83, Murphy-
81, Frankfurter-73, and Jackson-71.
93. See 13 U.S.L. Week 3022, 3494; 14 U.S.L. Week 3444; 16 U.S.L. Week 3019,
3383; 18 U.S.L. Week 3019.
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Roosevelt Court. He did not hesitate to speak out in vigorous fashion
when he felt that a "wrong" decision was being reached. As a member
of a strong minority group on the Court, he may have dissented with
an eye on the fifth vote (i.e., Stone, Reed, etc.) that would be needed
in future cases if more adequate protection for civil liberties was to
be assured. Whether he was successful in bringing these votes to his
side in crucial five to four decisions must remain a matter of specula-
tion until time reveals the more intimate details of the Court's func-
tioning in this period.9 In view of the relatively small number of
majority opinions that he wrote for the Court, although several of
these were of considerable importance, his greatest influence on the
Court may have come from his concurring and dissenting opinions.
Justice Rutledge spoke out in defense of civil liberties during a
high point in the Court's defense of individual freedom. His death,
together with that of Murphy, and the succession of Harry S. Truman
to the Presidency signified the end of the Roosevelt Court. This was
soon obvious to many observers as the appointments of Tom Clark
and Sherman Minton were announced, and the evolution of the
Roosevelt Court into what has come to be called the Truman or
Vinson Court was even more apparent during the 1949 and 1950
terms of Court.95
To some it was the logical result of inevitable changes in our
constitutional system as the turnover of judicial personnel spelled
basic changes of doctrine and theory.96 Others called the passing of
Rutledge and Murphy a "bitter blow" and forecast an "abandonment
of the great tradition of an independent and spirited judiciary.
97
The official organ of the American Federation of Labor paid tribute
to the two justices who had upheld the rights of "the little fellow,"
labor, the downtrodden and the oppressed.98 The so-called "liberal
press" asserted that the appointment of Minton to replace Rutledge
was a clear indication that the influence of the latter on the bench
would decline. As one critical commentator viewed the Minton
selection:
94. See discussion in Harper, Decision by Silence, The Atlantic Monthly,
Apr., 1952, p. 44. Also note comments in Harper, Mr. Justice Rutledge and
Full Faith and Credit, 35 IoWA L. REV. 605 (1950).
95. Harris, Constitutional Law in 1949-1950, 45 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 86 (1951);
Scanlan, The Roosevelt Court Becomes the Truman Court, 26 NOTrS DAMS
LAW. 214 (1951); Woolsey, The Supreme Court: This Term and Last, Fortune,
Oct., 1949, p. 163.
96. See, e.g., Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 52 (1950).
97. Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the Truman Bloc, 26 IND. L. J. 153, 168
(1951); Scanlan, The Passing of Justice Murphy-The Conscience of a Court,
25 NoTm DAmE LAw. 5, 38 (1949).




The plain fact is that, apart from judicial ability and personal integrity,
no qualification for-Rutledge's seat really matters except a social liberalism
that would keep the court abreast of the times. . . . What was needed
was an appointment on a higher level of politics, one that would assure
the country of an intellect and a will devoted to the constant refreshening
of the Constitution in the light of current social demands and yet jealously
protective of the freedoms laid down in that document.99
The fears of these critics were realized as the decisions of the
1949 term were announced. With Justice Douglas absent most of the
term, only Justice Black remained of the old liberal minority.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge died, were buried, were mourned-and
were replaced .... On October 3, 1949, at the first session of the new term,
Chief Justice Vinson concluded his memorial remarks with the words,
"Saddened by our losses but inspired by the examples of devotion to duty
which Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge have provided for
us, we turn to the work before us." By the first opinion day, the bar
knew that the "work before us" consisted, in substantial part, of rejecting
the work and the philosophy of the late justices.10O
It is not within the scope of this article to evaluate the changes in
constitutional doctrine and decision that have taken place since the
death of Rutledge. It is merely noted here that his death and the
subsequent appointment of a man who was not of the same thought
and temperament brought about a distinct change not only in the
personnel of the Court but also in its basic attitude toward the pro-
tection of substantive civil liberties and procedural rights in criminal
law. The Court had very definitely come to the end of a liberal era
in which Rutledge and the others of the liberal bloc (i.e., Black, Mur-
phy, and Douglas) had made substantial contributions to the "fulfill-
ment of the constitutional ideals of liberty." The deaths of Murphy
and Rutledge were a fatal blow to this wing of the Court. As a
writer in the New Republic viewed the event two years later:
That twin disaster cut the very heart out of the enlightened attempts to
discharge the constitutional promises of freedom. The liberal wing of the
Court was left devastated, shorn of its two most impassioned and coura-
geous voices. Gone were two vital votes .... [T]he tendency now is to
dilute the strong libertarian and humanitarian strains infused into the
Constitution over the past decade or two. There is no longer much respect
for the views of Holmes, Brandeis or Stone, much less the views of
Murphy and Rutledge.O'
Although current trends in constitutional law may indicate a rejec-
tion or repudiation of the basic ideas and concepts of Rutledge, par-
99. Bendiner, Politics and the High Court, The Nation, Sept. 24, 1949, pp.
292-93.
100. Frank, supra note 96, at 1.
101. Gressman, The Tragedy of the Supreme Court, The New Republic,
Sept. 3, 1951, pp. 10-11.
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ticularly with respect to procedural rights and first amendment
freedoms, the longer view of history may provide a different verdict.
In an era when it seems apparent that the state is assuming more
and more control over the social and economic welfare of the indi-
vidual, the need for adequate protection of civil liberties is even
greater.102 Perhaps Rutledge had an answer to this problem as he
attempted to reconcile the dignity and freedom of the individual with
the curtailment of an economic democracy that subordinated the
liberty of the individual to the welfare of the group in socio-economic
matters. For Rutledge it was "not enough for mans social living that
merely some sort of accommodation be made between his desire for
freedom and the demand of the community, as also of himself, for law
and stability." In an enduring society it was essential that the right
adjustment between man and man and between the individual and
society be achieved, with the realization that complete social, eco-
nomic, or legal justice could not be imposed by any state or legal
system without destroying the most basic freedoms of all, "the free-
doms to think and to believe as one's lights and conscience give him
direction and compulsion.'
' 0 3
Rutledge thus sought to find equity and justice in the interpreta-
tion of the constitutional and statutory law to the end that the "law
might serve human needs." He recognized, however, that in the last
analysis man should not be restrained by the state in the realm of
the mind and the spirit or in his enjoyment of equal justice under
the law. The history of American constitutional law may eventually
reveal the validity of his opinions, if, as Cardozo insisted, the future
tide of judgment rises and falls, crumbling the sands of error.
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense
ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is erroneous is pretty sure to
perish. The good remains the foundation on which new structures will be
built. The bad will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years.
... In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant
rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure and
sound and fine.1 04
So may it eventually be with the judicial concepts of Mr. Justice
Wiley Blount Rutledge.
102. R OTTSCHAEFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND SocIo-ECONOIMIC CHANGE 236
(1948).
103. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 14 (1947).
104. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178-79 (1921).
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